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Abstract 
We implement a modified version of DebtRank, a measure of systemic impact inspired in 
feedback centrality, to recursively measure the contagion effects caused by the default of a 
selected financial institution. In our case contagion is a liquidity issue, measured as the 
decrease in financial institutions’ short-term liquidity position across the Colombian 
interbank network. Concurrent with related literature, unless contagion dynamics are 
preceded by a major –but unlikely- drop in the short-term liquidity position of all 
participants, we consistently find that individual and systemic contagion effects are 
negligible. We find that negative effects resulting from contagion are concentrated in a few 
financial institutions. However, as most of their impact is conditional on the occurrence of 
unlikely major widespread illiquidity events, and due to the subsidiary contribution of the 
interbank market to the local money market, their overall systemic importance is still to be 
confirmed. 
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One lesson from the Global Financial Crisis is that the soundness of each financial 
institution does not ensure the stability of the financial system, per se. Likewise, it has been 
put forward that financial institutions’ liquidity is not ensured by the liquidity position of 
each single institution, but that their interconnections may determine whether they are able 
to fulfill their short-term liquidity needs. In this sense, as Allen and Gale (2000) noted, 
interconnections between financial institutions determine the possibility and extent of 
financial contagion. 
Financial institutions’ interconnections comprise direct and indirect linkages (Allen and 
Babus, 2009). Direct linkages are related to mutual exposures acquired in financial markets 
(e.g. interbank lending, securities and foreign exchange settlements), whereas indirect 
linkages correspond to holding similar portfolios (as in fire-sales) or sharing the same mass 
of depositors (as in deposit runs). We focus on direct-linkage contagion. 
Despite differing in their specific features and assumptions, most direct-linkage contagion 
simulation models focus on how defaults on mutual exposures may erode financial 
institutions’ solvency by affecting their capital buffer.
5
 Theoretical works use artificial 
networks to investigate how financial systems’ structure and capitalization affect systemic 
risk (see Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007), and Gai and Kapadia (2010)). They 
find that contagion decreases with capitalization, but increase with concentration or with 
the size of interbank liabilities. About connectivity, they find that the relationship with 
contagion is non-monotonic: when connectivity is low (high), an increase in the number of 
links increases (decreases) the likelihood of knock-on defaults. Roukny, Bersini, Pirotte, 
Caldarelli, & Battiston (2013) find that the network topology matters only –but 
substantially- when financial markets are under stress (e.g. illiquid). 
Furfine (2003) is among the first to study contagion by examining actual interbank 
exposure data. Furfine’s main finding is that bilateral interbank exposures in the U.S. are 
neither large enough nor distributed in a way to cause a great risk of contagion by capital 
                                                          
5 See Upper (2011) for a comprehensive review on interbank contagion simulation methods prior to 2010. 
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exhaustion, with very few cases of knock-on effects arising from a financial institution 
failing. The number and capitalization of counterparties are identified as key determinants 
of contagion. As reported by Upper (2011), most extensions and enhancements after 
Furfine (2003) point out that direct contagion based on actual interbank exposures is likely 
to be rare, and it can only happen if interbank exposures are large relative to lender’s 
capital. 
A recent development on direct-linkage contagion simulation models is DebtRank 
(Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca, & Caldarelli, 2012). Inspired by feedback centrality, 
DebtRank recursively measures the impact of the default of a selected financial institution 
on the capital buffer of financial institutions across the entire financial network. DebtRank 
serves to determine the size of contagion caused by the initial default of a financial 
institution, besides providing an assessment of the systemic importance of each financial 
institution based on the severity of its impact over the system. However, unlike previous 
direct-linkage contagion models based on default cascade dynamics, the impact from 
default is not limited to those cases in which the capital buffer is exhausted: partial impact 
on solvency is quantified and accumulated recursively. Some implementations of DebtRank 
on actual data are available (e.g. Tabak, Souza, and Guerra (2013), Battiston, Caldarelli, 
D’Errico, and Gurciullo (2015), Poledna, Molina-Borboa, Martínez-Jaramillo, van der Leij, 
and Thurner (2015)). 
Most research on direct-linkage contagion focus on contagion the subsequent failure of 
other financial institutions by means of capital buffers exhaustion (i.e. a solvency issue). 
Nevertheless, liquidity is a key factor as well. Furfine (2003) concludes that the liquidity 
effect, in the form of the unwillingness to lend money due to the inability to borrow, may 
be greater than the solvency effect in the U.S. interbank markets. Müller (2006) concludes 
that direct linkages affect solvency and liquidity substantially in the Swiss interbank 
market, and that both sufficient capital and liquidity buffers are necessary to mitigate spill-
overs. Cepeda and Ortega (2015) find that liquidity contagion in the Colombian large-value 
payment system is mitigated when considering the stock of high-quality assets available as 
a potential source of liquidity. 
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We implement a modified version of DebtRank in order to recursively measure the impact 
of the default of a selected financial institution on the short-term liquidity position of 
financial institutions across the entire interbank network. We construct the financial 
network based on actual interbank (i.e. non-collateralized) data from the Colombian 
financial market. We use the local version of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
6
, the 
Liquidity Risk Indicator (    by its acronym in Spanish), as the initial short-term liquidity 
position of financial institutions. Our modified version of DebtRank allows for determining 
the size of short-term liquidity contagion caused by the default of a designated financial 
institution, and for assessing the systemic importance of each of these institutions based on 
the severity of its impact over the short-term liquidity of the system. 
Consistent with most related literature (e.g. Furfine (2003), Upper (2011), Roukny et al. 
(2013)) we find that –ceteris paribus- in the Colombian interbank market contagion effects 
are not a threat to the stability of the system by themselves. Unless a major –but unlikely- 
drop in the short-term liquidity position of all participants precedes contagion, we find that 
contagion effects are rather small. It is most likely that the small size of Colombian 
interbank market exposures with respect to the short-term liquidity position of financial 
institutions (about 1.5% of    ), along with the subsidiary contribution of interbank loans 
to liquidity exchanges between financial institutions (about 9.68%), may explain why 
contagion effects alone are trivial.  
Our results support a salient feature of past financial crisis reported by Upper (2011): the 
vast majority of banking crisis followed shocks that hit several banks simultaneously rather 
than domino effects from idiosyncratic failures. Our methodological proposal provides a 
quantitative assessment of financial institutions’ systemic importance based on their 
potential contagion effect in the short-term liquidity position of the remaining financial 
institutions across the Colombian interbank network. Moreover, based on the potential 
effect on the system’s liquidity, our results may provide a quantitative assessment of the 
liquidity that should be obtained from other available sources in case of a default by a 
financial institution, such as collateralized borrowing (e.g. from other financial institutions 
                                                          
6 The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) has the purpose of ensuring that each financial institution has an adequate stock of 
unencumbered high-quality liquid assets that can be easily and immediately convertible into cash, in private markets, so as 
to meet its liquidity needs for a stress scenario of thirty calendar days (see BCBS (2013)). 
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or the central bank), selling financial assets or increasing deposits. However, as our results 
are limited to the local interbank market, conclusions are to be weighted according to its 
contribution to the money market and to the size of the financial system. 
 
2 Methodology 
There is a rather recent interest in using network analysis in finance and economics, with 
great emphasis on systemic risk and financial stability. Under this approach financial 
institutions are nodes that participate in a system (e.g. large-value payment, securities 
settlement) or market (e.g. interbank, derivatives), with their exposures or payments as their 
links. In a formal setting, financial institutions as well as their connections are represented 
in a network of mutual claims or flows, with elements arranged in a squared and potentially 
non-symmetric (i.e. non-reciprocal) matrix, with elements in the main diagonal equal to 
zero due to self-connections’ absence or lack of economic interest.  
Several methods or measures pertaining to the realm of network analysis have been used to 
assess the extent to which a default or failure-to-pay by a financial institution may affect 
others in an interconnected environment. A natural choice is to use centrality measures as 
proxies for financial institutions’ systemic importance, and to use such measures to 
estimate their contagion potential in the network under analysis.  
2.1 From centrality to DebtRank 
The simplest measures of centrality, namely degree centrality and strength centrality, 
corresponding to the number of links and their weight, are not particularly useful for 
measuring contagion dynamics. They are local measures of centrality (i.e. non-adjacent 
nodes are not considered), thus they do not serve the purpose of estimating impact in a 
network-wide level. Path dependent centrality measures, namely closeness centrality and 
betweenness centrality, may take into account non-adjacent nodes by calculating how far 
nodes are in terms of the number of links that compose the shortest paths between them, 
and the fraction of those shortest paths that run through each node, respectively. However, 
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measuring centrality based on the shortest path between financial institutions may be 
difficult to interpret in a financial contagion context (see Soramäki and Cook (2013)).  
Feedback centrality refers to all those measures in which the centrality of a node depends 
recursively on the centrality of the neighbors (Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca, & 
Caldarelli, 2012b). The simplest measure of feedback centrality is eigenvector centrality 
(Bonacich, 1972), whereby the centrality of a node is proportional to the sum of the 
centrality of its adjacent nodes. Thus, the eigenvector centrality of a financial institution is 
the weighted sum of all other financial institutions’ centrality at all possible order 
adjacencies (see Newman (2010)). Eigenvector centrality’s analytical value for measuring 
contagion dynamics is illustrated by Soramäki and Cook (2013), who depict eigenvector 
centrality as the proportion of time spent visiting each node in an infinite random walk 
through the network. Other popular feedback centrality measures based on eigenvector 
centrality are PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998), which is the algorithm behind Google’s 
search engine; hub centrality and authority centrality (Kleinberg, 1998); and SinkRank 
(Soramäki & Cook, 2013). 
All feedback centrality measures share a common drawback when applied to contagion 
dynamics: in presence of a cycle (i.e. a loop) in the network there is an infinite number of 
reverberations of the impact of a node to the others and back to itself, which impedes 
simple and measurable economic interpretations (Battiston et al., 2012). That is, despite 
they are useful by providing relative measures (i.e. scores) of the importance of each node, 
feedback centrality measures fall short when a monetary value of the size of contagion is 
required.  
DebtRank (Battiston et al., 2012) is a centrality measure inspired in feedback centrality that 
overcomes this drawback by not allowing such infinite number of reverberations through 
the network. By excluding walks in which one or more links are repeated it has a 
measurable economic interpretation (see Appendix 1). As defined by Poledna et al. (2005), 
it is a quantity that measures the fraction of the total economic value in the financial 
network that is potentially affected by the distress of an individual node or a set of nodes. 
Moreover, DebtRank also accounts for the fact that when a default does not propagate in 
the form of a subsequent default there is still a contagion effect in the form of a reduction in 
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the robustness (i.e. solvency) of those directly affected, and potentially in the robustness of 
the entire network. These two features allow DebtRank to provide a simple and 
economically meaningful measure of the size of the contagion dynamics following the 
default of a designated financial institution, and a forthright measure of its systemic 
importance. 
Our methodological approach to determine the size of contagion caused by the default of a 
financial institution in an interbank exposures network is closely related to DebtRank. 
However, our approach does not rely on how the exposure among financial institutions may 
affect their capital buffer (i.e. a solvency issue) in case of a default by a designated 
financial institution, but on how it may affect their short-term liquidity. Hence, in our case 
we measure the depletion of short-term liquidity when financial institutions face the failure-
to-pay of a participant of the interbank claims network. A straightforward byproduct is 
assessing the systemic importance of financial institutions in the local interbank market. 
2.2 The inputs 
Two main inputs are used in our approach: a proxy for the short-term liquidity of financial 
institutions participating in the interbank market, and the actual network of interbank 
financial claims.  
The first input, a proxy for the estimated short-term liquidity position of the  -financial 
institution ( ̂ ), is our individual measure of financial robustness –instead of a proxy for 
solvency. We use the coverage provided by financial institution  ’s high-quality liquid 
assets to meet the estimated net liquidity requirements for a 7-day horizon, as reported by 
local financial institutions to the Colombian Financial Superintendency.
7
 Hence,  ̂ ( ) 
denotes the estimated short-term liquidity position of financial institution   at time  . 
The calculation of the     involves the estimation of high-quality liquid assets’ value and 
of net liquid requirements; therefore, its calculation is intricate, with several non-linear 
                                                          
7 This proxy corresponds to the 7-day     (indicador de riesgo de liquidez).     resembles the LCR by BCBS (2013). It 
is an indicator designed by the Colombian Financial Superintendency to gauge the liquidity risk of financial institutions 
for regulatory purposes. Using the 7-day     is interesting as it is a rather stringent measure of liquidity, and it is available 
on a weekly basis. An alternative proxy for the short-term liquidity may be the net liquid assets (i.e. liquid financial assets 
minus current liabilities), or some other balance-sheet measure of short term liquidity; however, as balance-sheet is a low-





 Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, we use the reported value of the expected 
short-term liquidity position ( ̂ ) as a proxy of the short-term liquidity position of each 
financial institution, and we affect it in a linear manner: say, not collecting $1 in interbank 
loans due to counterparty’s default will decrease the short-term liquidity position by $1. 
This simplification not only allows designing a generalized version of the algorithm, but 
also makes changes in liquidity tractable, while preserving the analytical substance of the 
model. 
The second main input in our approach is a directed weighted network in which nodes 
represent financial institutions participating in the interbank market, with links representing 
non-collateralized financial claims. Let   be the weighted matrix representing the network 
of interbank claims, with     containing the outstanding amount that financial institution   
owes to  . 
If financial institution   is unable to refund an interbank loan to  , then   faces an 
unexpected reduction of its robustness,  ̂ . It is an unexpected reduction because j could not 
anticipate i’s failure to pay when estimating its short-term liquidity position; that is,   had 
estimated its short-term liquidity position under the assumption that   would fulfill its 
commitment to refund.
9
 The unexpected reduction in short-term liquidity faced by  ’s 
counterparties (i.e. the system) is    ∑     . 
2.3 The dynamics 
Whenever financial institution   fails to pay   the outstanding amount     at moment  , the 
liquidity position of   is affected unexpectedly:  ̂ (   )   ̂ ( )     . The aftermath of 
the updated short-term liquidity position of   depends on the choice of a short-term liquidity 
threshold that allows considering   as imposing (or not) a significant risk for the system. 
Let   be such short-term liquidity threshold,   fails to pay its counterparties as a 
consequence of the failure of   to refund the outstanding amount     whenever  ̂ (   )  
                                                          
8 See Annex 1 of Colombian Financial Superintendency’s Circular Externa 017 de 2014. 
9 As customary (see Battiston et al. (2012), Tabak et al. (2013)), because bankruptcy procedures may be rather lengthy, we 
assume that in the short-run there are no losses’ recoveries. Likewise, as netting in interbank borrowing is not a common 
practice in the local market, we also assume that no netting of claims is available; however, netting may be appropriate for 
examining other types of financial exposures, say derivatives. 
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 . In such case   enters into default (i.e. it is unable to pay), and the process continues 
recursively. On the other hand, if  ̂ (   )      is affected but it does not default:   is able 
to fulfill its commitments to refund its counterparties, but its short-term liquidity position 
and that of the entire system have decreased (i.e. the robustness of   and the system has 
weakened). 
A natural choice for the short-term liquidity threshold is    . A financial institution   
with a short-term liquidity position below zero may be considered in the limit of failing to 
fulfill its immediate commitments to pay: liquidating the stock of high-quality liquid assets 
would not suffice to face estimated short-term net liquidity requirements. Technically 
speaking this does not mean that   is in default or that it is unable to pay; it may still be able 
to get new funds from other financial institutions or the central bank, to roll-over existing 
loans or to increase deposits. Nonetheless,  ̂    is a rather clear signal of a substantial 
exposure to potential liquidity risk, and it should force certain actions from the financial 
institution. Hence, for analytical purposes, we set     for determining the tipping point 




Formally, analogous to DebtRank, the dynamics are as follows. As before,  ̂  is the short-
term liquidity position of financial institution  , which is a continuous variable with 
 ̂   [    ].    is a discrete variable with three possible states, undistressed ( ), 
distressed ( ), and inactive ( ), corresponding to institutions able, currently unable (i.e. in 
default), and already unable (i.e. defaulted earlier or with  ̂   ) to refund their interbank 
loans, respectively (   {     }). Let  ̂ ( ) denote the actual value of  ̂  (i.e. the reported 
   ),   be the set of financial institutions unable to pay (i.e. distressed or inactive) at    , 
                                                          
10 Technically, a financial institution with a negative 7-day     may be able to pay its counterparties, and it may be 
solvent as well. Likewise, in DebtRank (Battiston et al., 2012) it is arguable that a financial institution may be viable (e.g. 
able to pay) even after the capital buffer against shocks is exhausted. In fact, as balance sheets are updated on a monthly 
basis, financial institutions may continue to function for days or weeks before the capital buffer is officially reported as 
exhausted. Another case is also possible: as in Müller (2006), solvent financial institutions may find themselves in default 
because they have no liquid assets to refund their borrowing. 
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and   the selected short-term liquidity threshold that determines the ability to pay, the 
initial conditions (   ) are:11 
 ̂ ( )   ̂ ( )        ( )           
  [1] 
 ̂ ( )            ( )           
 
Afterwards (i.e.    ), the dynamics of  ̂  and    are determined by the specification below 
(in [2] and [3]). As usual, the dynamics depend on the initial conditions, namely the initial 
allocation of robustness ( ̂ ( )), the structure of the interbank claims network (   ), and the 
initial choice of financial institutions in distress ( ). The key in the dynamics is that the 
sum in [2] (i.e. the liquidity impact) arises from those   financial institutions that entered in 
distress in the preceding period (i.e. those   that are neither undistressed nor inactive). 
 ̂ ( )     {   ̂ (   )  ∑    
      (   )  
}       [2] 
and   
  ( )  {
 if  ̂ ( )      and    (   )           
 if   (   )                                 
   (   ) otherwise.                                     
  [3] 
 
The process continues recursively, and it is repeated for each financial institution with 
commitments to refund. The process for each  -financial institution stops at time   when all 
financial institutions are either inactive or undistressed (i.e. no distressed institutions 
pending to impact the system). The measure of the distress (in [4]) caused by the set   is 
the change in the overall short-term liquidity position of the system from     to  . If   is 
a single financial institution, such change is denoted   , and it gauges the impact of that  -
financial institution in the system’s ability to pay as measured by the variation in the short-
                                                          
11 This means that at     two types of institutions may be unable to pay. Those selected as unable to pay by forcing their 
state to distressed irrespective of their short-term liquidity position (i.e. designated financial institutions), and those that 
have already a short-term liquidity position below the selected threshold (i.e.  ̂   ). 
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term liquidity position of its counterparties (i.e. the initial distress in   is not considered). In 
this case, the nominal value of    and its contribution to all financial institutions’ impact 
( ̅ ) are, respectively, 
   ∑ ̂ ( )
 




 ̅    ∑  
 
⁄  [5] 
 
As expected,    and  ̅  provide a straightforward assessment of the systemic importance of 
financial institution   in the interbank funds market. The higher the distress caused by a 
financial institution in the robustness of its counterparties (i.e. their short-term liquidity 
position), the greater its systemic importance in the interbank funds market. 
As pointed out by Tabak et al. (2013), it should be noted that adding the systemic 
importance of all financial institutions into a single figure (   ∑    ) may not be 
considered a measure of systemic risk or a measure of financial system’s impact. As it is 
the sum of financial institutions’ individual potential stress, it should be considered a proxy 
for financial system’s stress. As usual, a measure of systemic risk would require 
multiplying the size of the individual potential stress (  ) by the probability of its 
occurrence over a determined time horizon (as in Tabak et al. (2013) and Poledna et al. 
(2015)). 
 
3 The data 
Interbank exposures in   are estimated by means of an implementation of Furfine’s 
algorithm (Furfine, 1999) to data from the Colombian large-value payment system (see 
León, Cely, and Cadena (2016)).
12
 Interbank exposures networks are available with daily 
                                                          
12 Contrasting loans identified by implementing Furfine’s method on Colombian large-value payment system data with 
those consolidated from financial institutions’ reported data suggests that the algorithm performs well, and it is robust to 
changes in its setup (León et al., 2016). 
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frequency for April 1, 2013 – December 30, 2014 (i.e. 428 observations). During this 
period 33 financial institutions participated in the market
13
. Despite many other types of 
financial institutions are authorized to borrow and lend in the interbank funds market (e.g. 
investment funds, broker-dealer firms), actual participants are credit institutions only. As 
usual in non-collateralized funds markets around the world, most loans have a low time-to-
maturity at inception: 78.9% are overnight loans, and the average maturity is about 2.6 
calendar days. 
Figure 1 exhibits a graph representing   for a randomly selected date. Nodes represent 
financial institutions, with their height (width) corresponding to financial institutions’ 
contribution to the total value of claims as a lender (borrower). The direction of the arrows 
represents the existence of an interbank claim (i.e. from the lender to the borrower), 
whereas their width represents its contribution to the total value of claims in the system. 
Interbank exposures in   let us follow the path of direct linkages considered by the 
algorithm.  
 
                                                          




Figure 1. Interbank claims network for a randomly selected date. Nodes (in 
rectangles) correspond to participating financial institutions. The height 
(width) of each node corresponds to its contribution to the total claims of the 
market as a lender (borrower). The direction of the arrows represents the 
existence of an interbank claim (i.e. from the lender to the borrower), 
whereas their width represents its contribution to the total value of claims in 
the system. Non-connected nodes (in the right border of the graph) 
correspond to financial institutions without outstanding lent or borrowed 
amounts in the selected date. (Source: León et al. (2016)). 
 
The proxy variable we use for the short-term liquidity position is the 7-day     calculated 
by the Colombian Financial Superintendency based on financial institutions’ reports. This 
indicator is available at a weekly frequency (each Friday) from January 4, 2013 to 
December 26, 2014 (i.e. 104 observations). As the proxy for the short-term liquidity 
position has the lowest frequency (i.e. weekly) and the least number of observations, this 
variable determines the period and the frequency of data used in the exercise. Thus, the 
13 
 
sample period goes from April 5, 2013 to December 26, 2014, which corresponds to 90 
weekly observations (    ). 
In Colombia the short-term liquidity position (7-day    ) exceeds the interbank (i.e. non-
collateralized) exposures by two orders of magnitude (see Table 1). The mean (and 
maximum) interbank exposure is about 1.5% the mean (and maximum) short-term liquidity 
position. This is expected because the size of the local interbank funds market is rather 
small. Most liquidity exchanges between financial institutions in the money market consists 
of collateralized lending in the form of sell/buy backs (i.e. simultáneas), with the interbank 
(i.e. non-collateralized) market contributing with about 9.68% of the total.
14
 Despite the 
size of the interbank exposures appears to be negligible and incapable of resulting in 
sizeable liquidity contagion, examining how the short-term liquidity position is affected is 
relevant for analytical purposes. 
 
In Million COP 






Mean 16,299 1,098,813 
Standard deviation 2,731 2,195,172 
Maximum 215,500 14,391,923 
Minimum 50 156 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for interbank exposures 
and short-term liquidity position datasets. In millions 
of Colombian pesos (COP), based on daily data for the 
90 days under analysis. The short-term liquidity 
position exceeds the interbank exposures by two orders 
of magnitude. Only data with values greater than zero 
were used for the estimation of the statistics.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Based on 2014’s figures (see Banco de la República (2015)), collateralized lending between financial institutions (i.e. 
sell/buy backs and repos) account for about 90.32% of money market transactions. Interbank (i.e. non collateralized) 
lending accounts for the residual (9.68%). Intraday interbank lending is not considered because it does not entail a 
financial exposure at the end of the day. 
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Other research works do not limit their analysis to non-collateralized borrowing –like we 
do. For instance, it is unclear whether Battiston et al. (2012) distinguishes between 
collateralized or non-collateralized investments (i.e. funding) among financial institutions. 
However, in the case of collateralized funding (e.g. repos, sell/buy backs) the default would 
be followed by a rather swift process of liquidating and collecting the cash value of the 
pledged collateral, thus rendering direct contagion as an unlikely outcome. Consequently, 
despite including collateralized borrowing could make contagion effects sizeable, they 
should have a negligible impact in our examination of direct contagion: the main impact 
arising from a default (i.e. principal risk) is minimized by pledged collateral.
15
 The same 
argument applies for foreign exchange and securities transactions that are settled under 
exchange-for-value arrangements (e.g. delivery-versus-payment).  
Accordingly, instead of including collateralized funding or exchange-for-value transactions 
in order to magnify and examine the dynamics of liquidity contagion under debatable 
assumptions, we consider short-term illiquidity scenarios. We choose to examine the 
dynamics of liquidity contagion following an ex-ante generalized reduction in the short-
term liquidity position equivalent to a fraction of observed short-term liquidity position 
(   ). Let   be a fraction (  [      ]),  ̂  is the short-term liquidity scenario after a drop 
of    ̂ , with  ̂  (   ) ̂ . We expect that illiquidity scenarios, consisting of 
reducing the initial short-term liquidity position of financial institutions, will reveal how the 




4 Main results 
We choose to examine the dynamics of liquidity contagion following an ex-ante 
generalized reduction in the short-term liquidity position. 100 scenarios are selected, 
starting with a base scenario consisting of a null reduction ( ̂         ̂ ), throughout a 
                                                          
15 Yet, other risks related to collateralized lending –not considered here- would remain, such as replacement cost risk 
arising from a collateral with market value below the refund value, and the potential fire-sale risk arising from the 
widespread liquidation of collaterals to face the default. 
16 Moreover, the illiquidity scenarios considered, from 100% to 1% of 7-day    , allow for implicitly evaluating 
particularly interesting short-term liquidity levels. For instance, as reserve requirements are representative for the 
calculation of the     (i.e. the mean ratio of reserve requirements to     is about 24% for the selected sample), illiquidity 
scenarios corresponding to about 76% of the short-term liquidity are interesting to examine. 
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scenario consisting of short-term liquidity reduction equivalent to 99% of observed     
( ̂           ̂ ), with 1% increases (                   ). We expect the first 
scenario (   ) to show slight contagion effects –if any. Regarding the other 99 scenarios, 
we expect results to be monotonically increasing in the size of the reduction in short-term 
liquidity: the higher    (i.e. the size of ex-ante liquidity reduction), the higher the contagion 
effects.  
First, we report the effect of contagion. For each day and illiquidity scenario, we examine 
the average and maximum change in the short-term liquidity position of the system, and the 
number of financial institutions entering into default as a result of contagion. Second, 
concerned about financial institutions’ systemic importance, we report how designated 
individual financial institutions contribute to the contagion effect estimated for each day 
and illiquidity scenario. 
4.1 Contagion effects 
Figure 2 shows the mean contagion effects. Each (blue) line in Figure 2 corresponds to one 
of the 90  -day estimated average contagion effects initiated by all financial institutions 
with outstanding claims in the interbank market. That is, lines display the average percent 
drop in financial system’s short-term liquidity (y-axis) as a function of the selected 
illiquidity scenario ( ̂                  ). The bold (red) line is the mean of the 90 lines. 
As expected, the average contagion effect increases monotonically. Concerning the average 
contagion effect for the base case scenario ( ̂         ̂ ), effects are bounded to a rather 
negligible reduction in short-term liquidity, between 0.00% and 0.11%. The greatest  -day 
average contagion effect in our sample is equivalent to a reduction of about 5.90% in short-
term liquidity, but it occurs in the worst scenario ( ̂           ̂ )   It is straightforward 
that average contagion effects in short-term liquidity become relevant only after extreme 





Figure 2. Average contagion effects. Each line corresponds to one of the 
90  -day estimated average contagion effects caused by all financial 
institutions with outstanding claims in the interbank market (y-axis), as a 
function of the selected scenario ( ̂                  ). The bold line is the 
mean of the 90 lines. 
 
Studying the average contagion may hinder interesting effects in networks that are 
characterized by an inhomogeneous connective structure. By focusing on the average effect 
we are implicitly relying on the existence of a typical financial institution, a misleading 
approach due to the well-documented heterogeneous distribution of linkages and their 
weights among institutions participating in financial networks.
17
 Therefore, as it is 
advisable to study extreme cases in particularly heterogeneous systems –such as financial 
systems-, Figure 3 exhibits the maximum contagion effects. 
                                                          
17 It is well-documented that most real-world networks are inhomogeneous, with particularly skewed distributions of their 
connections (i.e. degree) and their weights, allegedly following a power law distribution in the form of a scale-free 
network. Actual financial networks have also been characterized as particularly skewed, either following a power-law 
distribution of linkages (see Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2004), Inaoka, Ninomiya, Tanigushi, Shimizu, and 
Takayasu (2004), Sorämaki, Bech, Arnold, Glass, and Beyeler (2007), Bech and Atalay (2010)) or some other type of 
skewed distribution (see Martínez-Jaramillo, Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Bravo-Benítez, and Solórzano-Margain (2012), 
Craig and von Peter (2014), Fricke and Lux (2014)). In the Colombian case actual financial networks have been 
characterized as approximately following a power-law distribution of linkages and their weights, including interbank 
networks (see Cepeda (2008), León, Machado, and Sarmiento (2014), and León and Berndsen (2014)).  
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Maximum contagion effect increases monotonically as well. The maximum contagion 
effect for the base case scenario ( ̂         ̂ ) is bounded to a reduction in short-term 
liquidity between 0.00% and 1.21%, which is –once more- rather negligible. The greatest 
 -day maximum contagion effect in our sample is equivalent to a short-term liquidity 
reduction of about 45.78%, but it occurs –again- only after a rather extreme and very 
unlikely illiquidity scenario ( ̂           ̂ )   
 
Figure 3. Maximum contagion effects. Each line corresponds to one of the 
90  -day estimated maximum contagion effects caused by all financial 
institutions with outstanding claims in the interbank market (y-axis), as a 
function of the selected scenario ( ̂                  ). The bold line is the 
mean of the 90 lines. 
 
Figure 4 compares the distribution of the average and maximum contagion effects for all 
financial institutions, and all illiquidity scenarios. As before, the average contagion effect is 
negligible, below 6% of the initial short-term liquidity for any financial institution or 
illiquidity scenario. The distribution of the maximum contagion effects displays sizeable 
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reductions in short-term liquidity, but they correspond to extreme illiquidity scenarios that 




Figure 4. Distribution of average and maximum contagion effects. The 
average contagion effect is negligible. The distribution of the maximum 
contagion effects displays sizeable reductions in short-term liquidity, but 
they correspond to extreme illiquidity scenarios that appear to be 
implausible at best. 
 
The time-series dynamics of potential contagion effects may be illustrative for monitoring 
purposes by financial authorities. For instance, tracking the dynamics of the average and 
maximum contagion effect for the base scenario ( ̂         ̂ ) may help to identify 
changes in the potential outcomes of a default for the interbank market, and the potential 
liquidity needs that the system may face in such event. Correspondingly, Figure 5 presents 
the dynamics of the estimated average and maximum contagion effects throughout the 
sample in the absence ex-ante liquidity reductions. Consistent with previous results, in the 
base case scenario the interbank market would face an average drop in short-term liquidity 
in the 0.00%-0.11% range, whereas the maximum drop would be in the 0.00%-1.21% 
                                                          
18 It is quite likely that financial authorities will avoid these extreme scenarios by any means necessary (e.g. last-resort 
lending facilities, emergency acquisitions or bail outs, etc.). 
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range. Once again, contagion in this type of base case scenario appears to be minor, but 
their time-series dynamics may be worth monitoring by financial authorities. 
 
Figure 5. Contagion effects throughout the sample. This figure displays 
the average and maximum contagion effect arising from the default of a 
financial institution for each day in the sample in the base case scenario 
( ̂         ̂ ). Consistent with previous results, in this scenario the 
interbank market would face an average drop in short-term liquidity in the 
0.00%-0.11% range, whereas the maximum drop would be in the 0.00%-
1.21% range. 
 
Estimating the effects caused by each financial institution defaulting under each illiquidity 
scenario for each of the 90 days in the sample yields 138,900 observations,
19
 of which 
98.97% correspond to dynamics not leading to any default. That is, irrespective of the 
designated default or the illiquidity scenario, subsequent defaults caused by contagion are 
particularly rare. As exhibited in Figure 6, 1,197 (0.86%) observations correspond to one 
financial institution defaulting. Cascades consisting of two, three, four, five and six 
defaulting institutions are rare as well, and they are observed in 172 (0.12%), 44 (0.03%), 
17 (0.01%), 3 (0.00%) and 1 (0.00%) occasions, respectively. Consequently, as expected 
                                                          
19 Observations result from multiplying the number of days (90) by the scenarios (100) by the number of financial 
institutions with outstanding borrowing in the interbank market in each day. 
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from the size of the Colombian interbank market, contagion effects are rather minor, and 
they tend to occur as the illiquidity scenario becomes tougher (i.e.  ̂     ). 
 
Figure 6. Number of financial institutions entering into default as a result of 
contagion. This figure displays the number of financial institutions that 
entered into default as a result of contagion dynamics (y-axis) for each one 
of the illiquidity scenarios (x-axis) for each of the 90 days in the sample. 
Each dot may represent more than one observation. Most of the 
observations (98.97%) correspond to no defaults. 
 
All in all, it is rather evident that contagion effects by themselves are not a threat to the 
stability of the system under analysis. Irrespective of the metric employed (i.e. the 
reduction in short-term liquidity or the number of institutions entering into default), results 
tend to display negligible or non-substantial contagion effects. Unless a major drop in the 
short-term liquidity of all participants precedes the contagion dynamics, we consistently 
find that the interbank network is rather robust to average events (i.e. the default of an 
average financial institution). Likewise, most maximum contagion events are far from 
substantial, whereas a major –but unlikely- drop precedes those that may be important for 
the short-term liquidity of all participants as well. 
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This result may be related to the size of the interbank market and its corresponding claims 
network. This lack of substantial contagion effects in the Colombian financial market is not 
limited to this study. Cepeda and Ortega (2015) also find that contagion in the Colombian 
large-value payment system is mitigated once high-quality assets are considered as 
potential sources of liquidity. Upper (2011) suggests that contagion due to exposures in the 
interbank loan market is an unlikely event in the sense that it happens in only a small 
fraction of the scenarios considered. In this vein, Roukny et al. (2013) report that contagion 
effects in financial networks are not substantial if no additional sources of distress (e.g. 
deposit runs, fire-sales, credit runs) are considered. Battiston et al. (2015) suggest that as 
financial regulation recommends financial institutions to keep individual credit exposures 
to a manageable limit (e.g. with respect to equity or total credit exposure), it is very 
unlikely that a single initial financial institution’s default triggers any other default. 
Therefore, our results regarding the limited impact of contagion effects in the local 
interbank market is an already documented trait of other financial markets. 
4.2 Systemic importance of financial institutions 
The previous section concluded that contagion effects are non-substantial. The number of 
financial institutions entering into default as a consequence of contagion dynamics is low, 
and it is rather an exceptional outcome that involves unlikely extreme illiquidity scenarios. 
Also, most reductions in short-term liquidity caused by contagion are non-substantial, and 
those that are non-negligible involve implausible extreme illiquidity scenarios as well. 
However, examining how individual financial institutions contribute to the occurrence of 
defaults and to the reduction in short-term liquidity may be illustrative about their systemic 
importance. The higher the contribution of financial institution   to contagion-related total 
short-term liquidity drops and defaults, the higher its systemic importance. 
Figure 7 displays to what extent each financial institution (y-axis) contributes to the 
contagion-related total short-term liquidity reduction for all illiquidity scenarios. It is 
evident that the default of financial institution #26 contributes the most to reductions in 
system’s short-term liquidity, about 14.2%. Accordingly, financial institution #26 may be 
easily deemed as the most systemically important for the interbank network under analysis 
in terms of its short-term liquidity effects. Financial institutions #24, 28, and 20 belong to a 
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second tier of systemically important financial institutions contributing with about 8%-9% 
each, whereas those remaining contribute with less than 7% each. 
 
Figure 7. Financial institutions’ individual contribution to system’s short-
term liquidity reduction for all illiquidity scenarios. The default of 
financial institution #26 contributes the most to reductions in system’s 
short-term liquidity, about 14.2%.  
 
About the contribution to the total number of defaults caused by contagion effects, Figure 8 
shows that financial institution #24 is the most representative (21.2%), and –hence- it may 
be considered the most systemically important financial institution in the Colombian 
interbank market in terms of subsequent defaults. The second financial institution is #11 
(17.6%). Financial institutions #17 and 26 belong to a third tier of systemic importance, 
contributing with about 11% and 10%, respectively. The remaining financial institutions 




Figure 8. Financial institutions’ individual contribution to system’s total 
defaults for all illiquidity scenarios. The default of financial institution 
#24 contributes with 21.2% of the defaults. 
 
As expected when assessing financial institutions’ systemic importance, we find that the 
negative effects resulting from contagion are decidedly concentrated in a few of them, 
namely in financial institutions #26, 24, and 11. However, as most contagion effects here 
portrayed are conditional on the occurrence of major –but very unlikely- scenarios of 
generalized illiquidity, conclusions about the systemic importance of these financial 
institutions for the entire financial system may be unjustified. Furthermore, their systemic 
importance is bounded to the local interbank network, which is not particularly 
representative of the whole financial system in the Colombian case. 
 
5 Final remarks 
We took advantage of the DebtRank methodology (Battiston et al., 2012) in order to 
examine how the default of a selected financial institution in the Colombian interbank 
network impacts the short-term liquidity position of its counterparties and the system as a 
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whole. Instead of focusing on the impact of default on financial institutions’ capital buffer 
(i.e. their solvency), we focused on how an initial default eroded their ability to refund 
interbank loans (i.e. their short-term liquidity) and eventually forced them into default. 
Consistent with literature on direct-linkage financial contagion (Furfine, 2003; Upper, 
2011; Roukny et al., 2013; Cepeda & Ortega, 2015), contagion effects resulting from an 
initial default in the interbank market are non-substantial. Unless contagion dynamics are 
preceded by a major –but unlikely- drop in the short-term liquidity position of all 
participants, we find that contagion effects on individual and system’s short-term liquidity 
are negligible. Our results are consistent with reported features of banking crisis, which 
tend to be caused by shocks that hit several banks simultaneously rather than domino 
effects from idiosyncratic failures (see Upper (2011)). Likewise, our results concur with 
those reported by Roukny et al. (2013), who find that network topology matters only when 
financial markets are under stress (e.g. illiquid). 
The methodological contribution of our work is relevant. By modifying DebtRank to 
recursively measure contagion effects in the short-term liquidity position of financial 
institutions we supplement financial authorities’ monitoring tools. In this sense, we capture 
the advantages of DebtRank to conveniently measure how contagion may affect financial 
institutions’ ability to refund interbank loans in the short-term. 
Despite the lack of systemic impact of contagion effects in the base case scenario, our 
results are valuable for financial authorities as well. The numerical outcomes provide an 
economically meaningful quantitative assessment of the systemic importance of financial 
institutions based on their potential effect in financial institutions’ short-term liquidity. 
Moreover, based on the potential effect on the system’s liquidity, our results provide a 
quantitative assessment of the liquidity that should be obtained from other available sources 
in case of a default by a financial institution, such as collateralized borrowing (e.g. from 
other financial institutions or the central bank), selling financial assets or increasing 
deposits. Nevertheless, as most contagion effects here portrayed are conditional on the 
occurrence of major –but unlikely- scenarios of generalized illiquidity, conclusions about 
the systemic importance may be unjustified. Consequently, it is important to emphasize that 
systemic importance resulting from this exercise is bounded to the local interbank network, 
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which may not be particularly representative of the whole financial system in the 
Colombian case. 
Due to the aim and scope of our research work there are several issues that should be 
addressed in order to enhance the examination of financial contagion in the Colombian 
case. For instance, as in Müller (2006), it is advisable to simultaneously examine the impact 
of default contagion on solvency and liquidity. Estimating how financial institutions react 
to their counterparties’ defaults (see Martínez and Cepeda (2015)) and incorporating such 
reactions in the contagion dynamics may enrich the analytical reach of the model as well; 
reactions by financial authorities should be interesting to consider too. Additionally, as in 
Tabak et al. (2013) and Poledna et al. (2015), it is imperative to articulate this type of 
systemic importance assessment with the estimation of default probabilities to assess 
systemic risk as financial systems’ expected impact over a determined time horizon. 
Furthermore, as illustrated in the multi-layer financial exposures network model by Poledna 
et al. (2015), it is convenient to link different sources of exposures among financial 
institutions (e.g. derivatives, security cross-holdings) in order to have a comprehensive 
measure of direct-linkage contagion; in this vein, it is likely that the non-substantial 
contagion effects here reported may be due to the underestimation of systemic impact that 
results from focusing on the interbank market only. Finally, it is also convenient to couple 
direct- (e.g. mutual exposures) and indirect-linkage (e.g. fire-sales, deposit runs, credit 
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7 Appendix 1: DebtRank 
As noted by Battiston et al. (2012), there are two variables associated to each node in a 
financial exposures network. One that measures each financial institution’s level of distress 
(  ) and another (  ) that denotes three possible states that this financial institution may 
take: undistressed ( ), distressed ( ) and inactive ( ). The individual level of distress (  ) 
is a continuous variable that takes a value in the zero-one closed interval [   ]. Thus, 
   ( )    corresponds to an undistressed financial institution whereas   ( )    belongs 
to a financial institution in default: 
  ( )     {    (   )  ∑      (   )
    (   )  
}     [6] 
 
For a given point in time    the dynamics for the      node (financial institution) are 
given by the minimum value between one and its updated level of distress. This updated 
level depends on its own level of distress registered in the prior period (  (   )) and the 
distress level that financial institution   received from its counterparties (represented by the 
summation of the impacts caused by all the      institutions that entered into distress in 
the former period (  (   ))). 
The weights matrix ( ) required to compute the individual level of distress (  ( )) 
contains impacts measured as the minimum value between one and the ratio of the total 
amount invested by a financial institution   in the funding of   (   ) to the level of capital of 
that financial institution (  )         {  
   
  
}. If node   defaults, node   suffers a loss 
equal to      As long as its level of capital overpass that loss (      ) the impact of node   
on node   is given by the liabilities-to-capital ratio, otherwise, that impact is equal to one 
(indicating that node   entered into default). 
The individual level of distress (given by [6]) can be computed only for    . For     an 
initial condition should be imposed in order to make this expression mathematically 
possible. This initial condition consists of setting   ( )              where  the (assumed) 
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initial level of distress is   , and    is the set of distressed nodes at     . It is also 
assumed that    [   ]   and that     represents the distressed node (Battiston et al., 
2012). Therefore, for     equation [6] determines the DebtRank dynamics, understood as 
the cases based on impacts that affect the nodes irrespective of whether default occurred 
(Battiston et al., 2015). The procedure continues computing impacts until all nodes in the 
network are either undistressed ( ) or inactive ( ). At that point the dynamics stop and the 
DebtRank (  ) measure can be calculated as: 
   ∑  ( )  
 
 ∑  ( )   [7] 
 
In equation [7] the economic value of a node is given by    , and is measured by financial 
institution’s assets invested as a fraction of the total assets invested in the market (   
   ∑    ⁄ ). Hence, DebtRank measures the distress of the entire system excluding the 
initial (assumed) level of distress (second term in equation [7]). In economic terms, this 
measure computes the total loss in the system (measured in monetary terms) generated by 
the assumed initial default (Battiston et al., 2012). 
Several authors have remarked the advantages of DebtRank, in contrast to other measures 
of systemic distress in a network (Battiston et al., 2012, Thurner & Poledna 2013, and 
Tabak et al., 2013). In particular, the DebtRank measure has an economic interpretation in 
monetary terms and, also, it is considered a good early-warning indicator candidate. 
Likewise, the computation of distress by means of DebtRank excludes the possibility of 
double-counting the impacts of a default. In other words, once a shocked financial 
institution has affected its counterparties it enters into an inactive state ( ), which permits 
that this institution be impacted by shocks coming from other participants in the market but 
blocks the re-transmission of these shocks. For this reason, unlike eigenvector centrality or 
PageRank, it is recognized that under the DR measure cycles have finite reverberation 
(Battiston et al., 2012). 
